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This paper discusses and analyzes current day utilization and performance of the 
tactical departure scheduling process in the National Airspace System (NAS) to 
understand the benefits in improving this process. The analysis used operational air traffic 
data from over 1,082,000 flights during the month of January, 2011. Specific metrics 
included the frequency of tactical departure scheduling, site specific variances in the 
technology’s utilization, departure time prediction compliance used in the tactical 
scheduling process and the performance with which the current system can predict the 
airborne slot that aircraft are being scheduled into from the airport surface. Operational 
data analysis described in this paper indicates significant room for improvement exists in 
the current system primarily in the area of reduced departure time prediction uncertainty. 
Results indicate that a significant number of tactically scheduled aircraft did not meet 
their scheduled departure slot due to departure time uncertainty. In addition to missed 
slots, the operational data analysis identified increased controller workload associated with 
tactical departures which were subject to traffic management manual re-scheduling or 
controller swaps. An analysis of achievable levels of departure time prediction accuracy as 
obtained by a new integrated surface and tactical scheduling tool is provided to assess the 
benefit it may provide as a solution to the identified shortfalls. A list of NAS facilities which 
are likely to receive the greatest benefit from the integrated surface and tactical scheduling 
technology are provided.  
I. Introduction 
 ASA‟s current Integrated Arrival/Departure/Surface research portfolio includes integration of surface 
information with en route departure scheduling. The Precision Departure Release Capability (PDRC) activity is 
assessing the value of using surface trajectory-based takeoff (OFF) time predictions for departure scheduling. 
Companion papers1,2 present a concept overview and results from benefits assessment studies. 
This paper describes the NAS shortfalls that PDRC technology seeks to address and assesses current PDRC 
levels of predictive accuracy against the current need. The document begins by describing a nation-wide survey of 
current tactical departure scheduling operations. Existing system shortfalls are then examined via a discussion of 
system performance along with the measurement approach and corresponding results. The shortfalls discussion is 
followed by a description of the current levels of OFF time prediction accuracy that can be obtained in the PDRC 
system today. The paper concludes with a discussion of sites most likely to benefit from PDRC technology. 
II. Current Day Tactical Departure Scheduling  
In order to identify existing shortfalls which may be eliminated with reduced departure prediction uncertainty, it 
is necessary to have an understanding of the current day tactical departure scheduling process. This section covers 
the following five topics: 1) Tactical departure scheduling overview, 2) Current Inbound Tactical Departure 
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Scheduling Capability, 3) Current Outbound Tactical Departure Scheduling Capability, and 4) Tactical versus 
strategic departure scheduling. 
A. Tactical Departure Scheduling Overview 
Tactical departure scheduling is the process used by ATC to regulate air traffic flow to eliminate local 
demand/capacity imbalances and satisfy local traffic management initiatives (TMIs). Tactical departure scheduling 
is not required during normal NAS operations as the airspace into which the flight is being released generally has 
sufficient capacity to accommodate the departure. However, during periods of high demand or low capacity for the 
airspace being scheduled into, tactical departure scheduling may be utilized.  
Tactical departure scheduling in the NAS today can be divided into two distinct tactical scheduling modes, which 
are outbound scheduling of departures from an airport within the departure Air Route Traffic Control Center 
(ARTCC, hereafter referred to as “Center”) to a remote Center and inbound scheduling of departures into an arrival 
stream of a Traffic Management Advisor (TMA) metered airport. The inbound and outbound terms are generic 
labels for tactical departure scheduling functions provided by existing decision support tools (i.e. TMA scheduling, 
„internal‟ scheduling, „adjacent‟ scheduling, „coupled‟ scheduling, extended metering, etc.) The flight length 
associated with the tactical timeframe varies somewhat in the literature. The authors chose an upper bound of 90 
minutes as the guideline for flight lengths subject to tactical departure scheduling. This flight length was chosen in 
part based upon information obtained from operational data usage of the decision support tools that support tactical 
departure scheduling.  
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship of the Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) departure airport relative to arrival metering 
to Houston Intercontinental (IAH) airport. Given that DFW resides within the IAH metering freeze horizon and the 
limited airspace available to maneuver after departure prior to the outer meter arc, a high level of departure 
prediction accuracy is required. Later sections provide an estimate as to the level of predictive accuracy that is 
required. 
Call For Release (CFR) is a common tactical departure scheduling procedure which requires Air Traffic Control 
Tower (ATCT) personnel to call the Center Traffic Management Unit (TMU) for a scheduled departure time prior to 
releasing the aircraft for departure. The 
CFR procedure is applied to departing 
aircraft in order to ensure the demand 
placed on local airspace resources do not 
exceed the available capacity. In a CFR 
scenario it may or may not be necessary to 
delay the aircraft based upon the latest 
information available on the constrained 
flow at the time that an aircraft is ready to 
depart. The improved departure time 
compliance associated with the CFR 
procedure provides more accurate schedule 
predictions than are available via the 
aircraft‟s filed flight plan departure time 
(also known as Predicted Departure Time 
or PTIME) or by use of Expect Departure 
Clearance Times (EDCTs). EDCT times 
are generated by Traffic Flow Management 
(TFM) as a part of the strategic departure 
scheduling system and are not intended for 
tactical use. Aircraft PTIMEs represent a starting point from which the departure planning process begins but are 
historically prone to OFF time uncertainty.3,4 
Metering Freeze Horizon
Outer Meter ARC
Meter Fix
Departure Airport
Arrival Airport
 
Figure 1. Inbound tactical scheduling geometry which requires a 
high level of departure prediction accuracy. 
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The required departure compliance window for CFR aircraft varies somewhat by facility. Today, no nationwide 
guidance exists, but based upon information obtained from traffic managers, generally inter-facility agreements call 
for flights to depart within a three minute window. This three-minute window is generally structured to allow 
departure two minutes prior to, or one minute later than, the target coordinated departure time. The idea of allowing 
the aircraft to depart two minutes early is that it is easier to delay the aircraft to fit into the constrained flow than to 
accelerate the aircraft to meet its scheduled time. Figure 2 provides an illustration of nationwide departure time 
compliance comparison between estimation 
methods available to TMCs during the month 
of January 2011.  January was selected for 
operational data analysis primarily due to the 
availability and completeness of the TMA 
operational data set during this time period. 
The values reported in Fig. 2 are the average 
absolute difference between the expected 
departure time and the actual departure time. 
The operational TMA data analyzed had 
information on aircraft PTIME, EDCT times, 
TMA times and actual departure times which 
were used for this nationwide departure time 
compliance analysis. An obvious difference 
exists in the departure time compliance 
between PTIME estimates, EDCT controlled 
times and CFR controlled times with the 
departure times coming from the CFR process 
providing the best compliance of the three. 
Using the CFR process during the month of 
January, approximately 69.2% of aircraft subject to CFRs in which TMA automation was utilized met the required -
2/+1 window. In contrast, if EDCT times were required to meet a -2/+1 window the compliance would have been 
approximately 20.4 %. Using PTIME compliance this percentage would drop to only 4% of flights that met the -
2/+1 window.  
 
B. Inbound Tactical Departure Scheduling Capability 
As adjacent center metering has expanded the reach of TMA, the greatest need for departure scheduling 
capability has been for airports residing in another Center.  Analysis of January 2011 operational data shows that 
69.3% of all departure scheduling is performed from an origination Center 
that is different than the destination Center being scheduled into. Table 1 
gives examples and frequency of usage of inbound tactically scheduled 
aircraft across Center boundaries during the month of January 2011. The 
“Number of Aircraft Scheduled into remote Center” lists the number of times 
a TMC from a Center other than the destination Center scheduled aircraft 
using TMA capability. Note that not all scheduling performed is from an 
adjacent center, for instance Indianapolis Center schedules into New York 
Center although the two Centers do not share a boundary. Another unique 
case occurs when aircraft departing Canadian airspace Call For Release into 
New York Center airspace.  
The expanded scope of TMA usage is a factor to consider in analysis of 
tactical departure scheduling shortfalls, another factor is the effect that tactical 
departure scheduling capability has on the balance of delay that is assigned to 
the airborne stream versus airport surface.  In December of 2005 a feature 
was added to TMA that allowed the TMC to determine whether or not 
departures should compete directly with active airborne flights. Prior to this 
feature, TMA always scheduled aircraft into the overhead stream in a manner 
that the departure had the same priority as airborne aircraft.  The intent of this 
feature was to prevent airborne delays from reaching the point which it made 
it difficult for controllers to achieve the TMA meter crossing times. However, 
 
Figure 2. Average Nationwide Departure time compliance for 
January 2011. 
Table 1. Departure Scheduling 
from remote ARTCC Jan 2011. 
From Center Into Center
Number of  Aircraft 
Scheduled into 
remote Center
Jacksonville Atlanta 6267
Washington Atlanta 6072
Boston New York 3955
Washington New York 3719
Indianapolis Atlanta 3081
Cleveland New York 3012
Oakland Atlanta 2951
Los Angeles Albuquerque 2243
Memphis Atlanta 1619
Canada New York 1234
Indianapolis New York 469
Cleveland Atlanta 389
Albuquerque Los Angeles 384
Fort Worth Houston 382
Chicago Cleveland 210
Kansas City Chicaco 102  
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the tradeoff associated with limiting the airborne delays is an increase in departure delays.  When the TMC chooses 
to delay the airborne flow, the TMA system will treat the departing aircraft with equal priority as airborne aircraft 
and assign a delay to unfrozen aircraft in the metered airborne stream if needed. In this situation, TMA may delay 
both the airborne stream and assign a ground delay to the departing aircraft. Analysis of the current usage based 
upon data from January 2011 indicates that the large majority (92%) of flights scheduled in TMA took all of their 
tactical departure delay on the surface. 
The ability for the TMC to determine whether the aircraft tactical delay should be taken airborne, on the surface, 
or a combination of the two is complicated by uncertainty in the scheduling process. Analysis of tactical departures 
scheduled into the arrival TMA system during metering indicates that approximately 21% of all scheduled aircraft 
experience both a TMA assigned ground delay and TMA assigned airborne delay. To prevent aircraft that are 
assigned delay on the airport surface from being delayed again once they join the airborne flow, the TMC may 
“freeze” the aircraft into the airborne flow when scheduling in TMA. If the TMC selects this option when 
scheduling a tactical departure, the TMA system will freeze the aircraft‟s scheduled time of arrival to the meter point 
thereby preventing any additional delay from being added to the aircraft once it becomes airborne. This feature 
allows the TMC to ensure the aircraft does not receive unplanned airborne delay; however, if the aircraft does not 
depart when expected and cannot achieve the time which is frozen into the arrival metering system‟s schedule, then 
the space that was being reserved for this aircraft will go unutilized barring additional action by ATC to prevent this 
from occurring. Currently, 29% of departing flights that are scheduled into an arrival TMA system are scheduled 
frozen into the airborne flow: the remaining 71% of aircraft are allowed to adjust their position in the TMA arrival 
schedule upon first surveillance. 
An additional shortfall of the current day inbound tactical departure scheduling system occurs when the tactical 
departure delays become very large. This situation may require Air Traffic Control System Command Center 
(ATCSCC) involvement. In the large majority of cases the assigned ground and airborne delay are small (i.e. less 
than 5 minutes 73% of the time in TMA), however, cases do exist in which airborne and/or ground delay is in excess 
of one hour. In the month of January there were approximately 20 occurrences of TMA assigned ground delays in 
excess of one hour. The majority of the examples of large TMA assigned ground delay were to either New York 
Center or Atlanta Center metered airports. In many cases, flights with high TMA-assigned surface delay also 
received an airborne delay from the TMA system. These examples of high ground delay with airborne delay may 
lend insight into why into why sites like New York Center and Atlanta Center are top users of the “schedule frozen” 
option previously discussed.  
When high tactically-assigned ground delay occurs in the NAS, the ATCSCC may choose to implement an 
Airspace Flow Program (AFP) to regulate the flow of aircraft into the destination airport with the objective of 
reducing the TMA-assigned surface delays. The AFP scheduling scenario used for this purpose is unique in that it is 
designed to work in conjunction with the arrival TMA system; hence it is called a TMA Flow Program (TFP). The 
objectives of a TFP are to pre-condition the arrival stream such that TMA can utilize available space in the stream 
for tactical departure scheduling purposes. The boundaries of the TFP are set to be roughly contiguous with the 
arrival metering system‟s freeze horizon and any airport with departures inside of this boundary are exempt from the 
program. Using a TFP the TFM 
suite of tools assigns a ground 
delay to aircraft bound for the 
metered airport which are located 
outside of the red circle shown in 
Fig. 3, while TMA assigns a 
tactical ground delay (and 
potentially airborne delay 
depending on TMC selection) for 
those aircraft bound to the 
metered airport located within 
the red circle.5 
 
Figure 3. Example of TMA Flow Program into Atlanta. 
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C. Outbound Tactical Departure Scheduling Capability 
In addition to the TMA arrival metering system, the Enroute Departure Capability (EDC) is now part of the 
tactical departure scheduling decision support tools available to TMC personnel. The EDC system design re-uses a 
number of common components of the arrival TMA system like its adaptation data structure, route processing 
algorithms and trajectory generation functions. While many of the core components of TMA have been leveraged to 
provide EDC capability, there are notable differences between arrival TMA and the EDC system.  
The EDC system serves a different traffic management objective than the arrival TMA system. EDC‟s focus is 
outbound tactical departures leaving from one of the airports within a Center which are destined to a remote Center 
facility. In contrast the tactical departure scheduling capability in arrival TMA system is only focused on aircraft 
that are scheduled into its metered airports. EDC is commonly used to assist in the application of miles in trail 
restrictions between facilities, especially when the airspace being scheduled into is highly constrained or has 
multiple miles in trail initiatives to satisfy. An additional use of EDC is to assist in regulating departures into sectors 
which are experiencing high demand. In contrast, arrival TMA use is primarily motivated by the traffic volume in 
the arrival streams entering the metered airport rather than sector loading considerations. 
The TMA EDC system is deployed to all 20 Centers within the NAS. Similar to the nationwide deployment of 
the arrival TMA system, there is significant variability in how EDC is used from one Center to another. As indicated 
by the blue portion of the bar chart in Fig. 4, the Center with the most frequent EDC usage is Boston Center, 
followed by Atlanta Center and Indianapolis Center. The combined usage of these three sites alone is greater than 
total EDC usage at all other Centers. Although Atlanta Center is the second largest user of EDC, the frequency of 
Atlanta‟s EDC usage is significantly less than that of inbound tactical departure scheduling into Atlanta‟s arrival 
TMA system. Figure 4 illustrates inbound and outbound tactical departure scheduling usage.  
 
The total departure delays assigned by Arrival TMA versus EDC follow a similar model with inbound tactical 
departure scheduling assigning a total of 3,563 hours of surface delay to aircraft in the month of January 2011 versus 
a total of 480 hours of surface delay assigned by the outbound tactical departure scheduling system (13.5% of 
inbound). 
 
Figure 4. Tactical Scheduling of Arrival TMA and EDC - Jan 2011. 
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D. Tactical Versus Strategic Departure Scheduling 
While a significant amount of literature exists on the strategic departure scheduling process within the NAS which 
utilizes the Traffic Flow Management (TFM) suite of tools, information on the tactical departure scheduling process 
is quite limited. The two scheduling processes are distinct from one another and are currently not directly integrated. 
The strategic and tactical schedules have similar, but different objectives and usage characteristics.  
A significant difference between tactical and strategic departure scheduling is the scope of the initiative. Strategic 
departure scheduling is focused on correcting large demand/capacity imbalances that exist in the NAS usually due to 
convective weather or high demand. This often requires significant delays over an extended period of time which 
may be assigned hours in advance of the affected aircraft‟s departure time. In contrast, tactical departure scheduling 
focuses on a specific air traffic flow that is subject to a local traffic management initiative (like Miles in Trail or 
Adjacent Center Metering) and generally introduces small delays to specific aircraft on an as-needed basis. 
Tactical departure scheduling system delays are approximately 4 minutes per aircraft on average with a median of 
1 minute, which is significantly lower than TFM delays with approximately 66 minute average and 52 minute 
median delays. These statistics are derived from January 2011 operational data. The difference in average delays is 
likely due to the national scope of TFM which must assign departure delay well in advance of departure, in contrast 
with tactical departure scheduling which applies delay on an as-needed basis to a single aircraft at a time. Tactical 
departure schedules are able to 
consider the latest airspace conditions 
minutes before takeoff.  
The frequency of use of tactical 
departure scheduling versus strategic 
as measured by the number of aircraft 
affected for January 2011 also varies 
significantly as illustrated in Fig. 5. 
The combined number of departures 
scheduled using the TMA and EDC 
tactical decision support tools 
(labeled “inbound” and “outbound” 
tactical departures in Fig. 5)  was  
approximately 350% greater than 
aircraft affected by EDCTs (strategic 
TFM controlled departures). It is 
worth noting that inbound tactical departure scheduling (i.e. using arrival TMA) occurred significantly more 
frequently than outbound tactical departure scheduling (i.e. using EDC). 
For this analysis, an aircraft was counted as being tactically scheduled only if the aircraft was both scheduled and 
„accepted‟ or „frozen‟ into the TMA Arrival or EDC system. A significant number of aircraft (approximately 18,489 
during January, 2011) were initially scheduled in the TMA system but the scheduling process was not finalized by 
“accepting” or “freezing.”   
   
III. NAS-wide Tactical Departure Scheduling Performance Analysis  
 In addition to analyzing the January operational data, operational observations of scheduling performance were 
evaluated at DFW during the month of July 2011. Data from operational observations were used as a point of 
reference with which to test the data analysis measurement methodologies that were applied NAS-wide. This section 
discusses the metrics used for tactical departure scheduling performance and the results obtained in this analysis. 
Potential benefits due to reduced departure time uncertainty from PDRC can be quantified by the improvement in 
meeting a slot, reduction of manual intervention to mitigate missed or unattainable slots, and increased flight 
efficiency due to a reduction in airborne vectoring and speed controls. 
A. ‘Hit Slot’ Metric  
A key performance measurement in the tactical departure scheduling process is the efficiency with which available 
airspace in the constrained flow are being utilized by scheduled departure aircraft. Gaining insight into this 
measurement is important because it allows an objective means to analyze the utilization of tactical departure 
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Figure 5. Departures Scheduled with Decision Support Tool - Jan 2011. 
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scheduling into the constrained overhead stream that may be lost due to departure prediction uncertainty. To obtain 
an assessment of slot utilization, operational data from the TMA and EDC systems were analyzed. A „hit slot‟ 
measurement was created for this analysis. The objective of the „hit slot‟ measurement is to determine whether or 
not the tactically scheduled departure joined the constrained flow at the sequence in which it was scheduled into 
prior to departure. This measurement allows an estimation of the effectiveness of the scheduling process based upon 
detailed scheduling information available in the operational TMA data.  This section discusses details on the 
estimation approach used for this metric as well as results. Figure 6 provides an illustration of the „hit slot‟ 
measurement geometry for DFW to IAH 
tactical departure scheduling.  
For the „hit slot‟ measurement, the 
leading and trailing aircraft identification,  
TMA and EDC estimated times of arrival 
to the meter point (known as Meter point 
ETAs) and scheduled times of arrival to 
the meter point (known as Meter point 
STAs) were collected at the time at which 
the aircraft was scheduled in the 
operational TMA and EDC systems. 
Aircraft sequence and scheduling 
information were also collected at the point 
at which the aircraft received its first 
surveillance hit, and then again when it 
crossed the meter point location. The 
leading and trailing aircraft identification 
were examined to determine if they 
matched at each point in the aircraft‟s 
flight history from scheduling, to first 
track, to the actual sequence at crossing. 
An aircraft was said to hit its scheduled 
slot if its sequence relative to its leading and trailing aircraft remained when it was scheduled and when it crossed 
the meter point location. The same „hit slot‟ sequencing analysis was repeated for each aircraft at the point at which 
surveillance was first acquired. This analysis measured whether or not the sequence provided by TMA and EDC 
after processing the first track hit matched the sequence at the actual meter fix crossing. This step was added to 
allow comparison of the difference in predictive accuracy between pre-departure scheduling versus attaining first 
surveillance. 
An important consideration of the „hit slot‟ measurement is determining the inclusion/exclusion criteria for 
aircraft to be used in the analysis. Aircraft which were excluded from the analysis included: 1) Aircraft which did 
not cross the meter point they were scheduled to due to lack of receipt of a crossing message, 2) Aircraft which did 
not have a record of leading and trailing aircraft at the point of scheduling, first track hit and crossing of the meter 
point based upon information available to the system at the point in time these events occurred 3) International 
tactical scheduling from Canada to NAS facilities given lack of departure time information available to TMA 4) 
Atlanta inbound tactical departure aircraft given the „hybrid metering‟ scenario that Atlanta uses does not allow 
display of metered sequence, 5) Aircraft for which a Host departure message was not received 6) For arrival TMA 
only metered aircraft were included, 7) Only aircraft which the TMC scheduled and „accept‟ or „froze‟ were used. 
To determine the sequence of aircraft at the times of interest mentioned above, the native stream class 
identification used by TMA and EDC was leveraged. For example, all jets scheduled over meter fix RIICE are a part 
of the RIICE_JETS TMA stream class. This information is made available in the native TMA data utilized for this 
analysis, as was the scheduled time of arrival to the meter fix (or meter point for EDC) for each stream class. The 
logic developed to support the „hit slot‟ measurement ordered all aircraft by STA from lowest to highest, by stream 
class. This ordering was of all aircraft which were “scheduled” in the operational TMA or EDC system, which 
included any tactical departure schedules that had been scheduled at that time. Upon each schedule update the 
leading and trailing aircraft of every flight was identified assuming one existed. If an aircraft did not have a leading 
or trailing aircraft in the scheduler, these values were subsequently ignored in the analysis as previously mentioned. 
Upon occurrences of events of interest the sequence was stored along with the other aircraft metadata for later 
analysis. 
 
Figure 6. "Hit Slot" metric geometry for DFW to IAH Scheduling. 
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The results from the „hit slot‟ analysis were separated into inbound (arrival TMA) versus outbound (EDC) 
tactical departure scheduling. A number of the results are represented as percentages due to inclusion/exclusion rules 
and data integrity checks. While certain aircraft had to be excluded to ensure data quality and that the measurements 
were on the right set of aircraft, the percentages are expected to hold true for the entire population of tactically 
scheduled departures in January due to the large sample size used for this analysis (over 22,400 aircraft after 
applying inclusion/exclusion logic).  
Table 2 shows a high-level summary of the results from running the „hit slot‟ measurement on all operational 
TMA and EDC facilities for the month of January. The “Hit Scheduled Slot %” column represents the percentage of 
all tactically scheduled aircraft in January 2011 that had the same leading and trailing aircraft sequence when 
scheduled on the surface as when they crossed the meter point being scheduled to. The “Hit First Surveillance Slot 
%” provides this information but uses updated sequence obtained from TMA or EDC after the first surveillance is 
made available. The “% Difference” takes the difference between the two hit slot percentages and then applies that 
percentage to all aircraft that were 
tactically scheduled to estimate to total 
number of aircraft that missed their slot due 
to departure time prediction uncertainty. 
Given that this difference provides an 
estimate of what the TMA and EDC 
algorithms had for their internal sequence 
prior to versus after first surveillance, this 
is believed to be a good estimate of slots 
that were missed due to departure time 
prediction uncertainty. 
Figure 7 provides an illustration of the 
departure events which collectively add to 
the uncertainty of tactical departure 
scheduling process.  This analysis captures 
information from TMA and EDC system 
predictions that occur when the TMC scheduled the aircraft in operations prior to wheels-off, then compares this 
estimate to the TMA and EDC predictions immediately after wheels OFF when surveillance is first acquired.  By 
capturing the estimates at these two time periods and comparing their difference, the ascent model portion of the 
prediction which is common between the two estimates, is isolated from the measurement. 
While a goal of tactically scheduling an aircraft into a constrained flow is to identify and utilize resources 
(„slots‟) before the aircraft departs, the impact to the NAS which occurs when a scheduled slot is not met can vary.  
Observed cases of missed tactically scheduled departure slots indicate that they can often lead directly to lost 
capacity, most notably delay caused by the case in which an aircraft is scheduled frozen into an arrival TMA slot but 
does not meet its expected departure time window. Other observed impacts of missing the departure slot are 
inefficient flight paths due to required vectoring and/or speed controls (which can lead to excess fuel utilization) as 
well as increased controller and TMC workload (discussed in later section). According to the hit slot metric data 
obtained, approximately 1 in 4 aircraft hit their arrival slot in TMA, while more than 1 in 3 hit their slot in the EDC 
system. The primary reason for the difference is believed to be the size of the slot being scheduled into given that 
the average stream class separation difference in EDC is much larger than that of TMA. Based upon operational data 
from January 2011, the average stream class separation for arrival TMA is 8.2 nm, while the average stream class 
separation in EDC is 23.6 nm. The larger separation in EDC is consistent with intuition given that EDC‟s purpose is 
primarily to ensure MIT separations are met and the required separation being enforced is often quite large. The size 
of the slot being scheduled into is also believed to be the primary difference in percentage of aircraft that hit their 
scheduled slot in arrival TMA and EDC after the first track hit. As table 2 indicates there is a significant difference 
with EDC approximately 18% more aircraft hitting the slot at this point in time versus arrival TMA. The percentage 
Table 2. 'Hit Slot' measurement results for all operational TMA/EDC facilities during January 2011. 
System
Hit Scheduled 
Slot %
Hit First 
Surveillance Slot % % Difference 
Estimated Number of Aircraft that missed their slot 
due  to departure time prediction uncertainty 
Arrival TMA 26.9 39.3 12.5 6792
EDC 39.4 57.1 17.7 1911  
 
Figure 7.  Tactical departure scheduling to the meter point 
incorporates cumulative uncertainty from a number of departure 
events. 
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of aircraft that hit their slot after surveillance suggest that there may be room for improvement in the predictive 
capabilities of the ascent modeling of TMA and EDC. Future analysis may be warranted to analyze predictive 
accuracy of the ascent modeling due to aircraft weight, wind error, inaccurate routing, etc.  
While, on average, aircraft hit their TMA-scheduled slots approximately 26.9% of the time, a fairly significant 
variation exists by site. The results of the hit slot metric were calculated for all TMA and EDC locations nationwide.  
The highest site percentage of the „hit slot‟ measurement of all the arrival TMA systems was 32.9%, while the 
lowest was 18.5%  The highest site percentage of all EDC systems was 52.5%, with the lowest being 22.7%.  The 
site specific variance may warrant additional consideration to determine the primary factors which lead to the 
variance.  Given that the „hit slot‟ percentage differs on a site by site basis, this suggests that the impact to the NAS 
may vary by facility as well. 
B. Arrival Metering Workload metric 
 In addition to missed slots from departure time uncertainty, another shortfall to consider in current day tactical 
departure scheduling is the workload for the TMC and controllers. During the month of January 2011 approximately 
153,426 flights had metering information delivered to sector controllers with the expectation that the controller 
would delay aircraft as necessary to meet the metered times.  Of the metered aircraft, approximately 34,360 (22.4%) 
were scheduled into the arrival stream using arrival TMA arrival scheduling capability. This represents a statistically 
significant portion of the overall metered aircraft during January.  
 The large sample of metered flights was analyzed to determine if manual intervention by either the sector 
controller or TMC during metering was higher for tactically scheduled departures than for flights which were not 
tactically scheduled. Three measures were utilized for this evaluation, which were the frequency controller swaps, 
controller resequences and individual aircraft reschedules by the TMC. The following gives a brief explanation of 
what these measures capture. 
 Sector controller tools associated with metering include two capabilities to control the sequence that TMA 
associates with arrival aircraft. These capabilities are known as swap and re-sequence. The swap capability allows 
the controller to identify any two aircraft on their display and exchange their meter point crossing times. This 
capability is used when the sector controller may disagree with the sequence or times that are being presented to 
him/her by the TMA system.  
The tactically scheduled departure aircraft and the flights which were not tactically scheduled were analyzed to 
determine the frequency of required manual activity. The increased percentage of aircraft that required manual 
controller or TMC activity during metering suggests that tactical departure scheduling is a factor in increased 
workload for both sector controllers and TMCs. The highest increase of manual activity observed was the 
percentage increase of aircraft that undergo a single aircraft re-schedule. This measure showed a 6.1% increase for 
tactically scheduled 
departures over those 
aircraft which were 
not tactically 
scheduled. A 
summary of these 
results can be seen in 
Table 3. 
C. Effect of not scheduling a tactical departure into a constrained flow 
 Observations of tactical scheduling performance from DFW into IAH during June and July of 2011 indicate 
that the benefit of increased departure time prediction accuracy may not be limited to the set of tactically scheduled 
departures previously discussed. Examples of these potential benefits were observed during PDRC engineering 
shadow evaluations.  A typical example of this was for aircraft departing DFW with a destination of IAH which 
were not scheduled in the TMA system. In these examples the departing aircraft was sequenced ahead of several 
other aircraft in the stream class that were in close proximity. The addition of the departing aircraft added a 1 minute 
delay to the immediate trailing aircraft, which in turn added two minutes of delay to its trailing aircraft, and so on for 
a total of four aircraft which received airborne delay due to the departing aircraft. Vectoring off of nominal routes 
was visually observed in a number of these cases. 
During PDRC observations in July, a number of occurrences were noted in which departures that were not 
tactically scheduled and coordinated between Center and ATCT personnel resulted in the use of speed controls 
and/or vectoring to accommodate the departing aircraft. During evaluations the “not scheduling” scenario which 
leads to this situation was discussed with Center personnel. Comments received indicate that while additional work 
Table 3. Percentage of aircraft which required manual intervention– Jan 2011. 
Workload Category Not Tactical Departure % Tactical Scheduled Departure % % Difference
Approximate # Aircraft 
subject to  increased 
manual activity
Controller Swaps 4.4 6.6 2.3 792
Controller Re-sequences 4.4 6.0 1.7 572
Single Aircraft Re-schedule 5.0 11.1 6.1 2125
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is needed by sector controllers to accommodate uncoordinated departures, this is not viewed as an issue for sector 
controllers so long as other sector workload does not rise to a level of saturation that makes handling uncoordinated 
departure scheduling problematic. This information is consistent with previous research into the effect of “not 
scheduling” an aircraft into an arrival TMA flow.3,4 However, beyond the sector workload implications is the 
consideration of flight efficiency which effect fuel consumption. A coordinated departure release may have helped 
to reduce speed controls and vectoring which may in turn help reduce fuel consumption. 
   
IV. Surface Departure Prediction Analysis  
The objective of PDRC is to leverage trajectory-based OFF time predictions to improve upon the current-day 
tactical departure scheduling process. Achieving this objective requires that one have accurate OFF time predictions 
from the surface system at the point in time which this information is required by the en route scheduling system. 
This section discusses a method to estimate the minimal required look-ahead time for OFF time predictions to 
satisfy tactical departure scheduling requirements. Also discussed are surface departure prediction accuracy 
requirements for present-day operations as well as recommendations for future surface analysis.  
A. Estimation of departure prediction look-ahead time requirement for Tactical Departure Scheduling 
 In an ideal scenario, highly accurate aircraft wheels OFF times would be available to tactical and strategic 
planners hours ahead of the point at which the aircraft was ready to depart. In this ideal scenario all planners would 
be working from the same set of accurate information and making decisions that could be used to address local, 
regional, or national demand/capacity imbalances. However, highly accurate OFF times hours in advance of 
departure is not a feasible objective given the amount of pre-departure uncertainty which exists today.3,4,6,7 The 
cumulative effect of uncertainty from pushback prediction, through ramp taxi, spot transition, air movement area 
taxi, departure queue management, departure release, take off roll, ascent modeling, and forecast wind errors prior to 
reaching the meter crossing point provide a large amount of unpredictability. This uncertainty makes the departure 
planning process quite challenging. 
While accurate wheels OFF estimates hours in advance may be an unrealistic objective in the NAS, providing 
accurate OFF time estimates minutes in advance of wheels OFF is an achievable objective which may help reduce or 
eliminate some of the challenges faced by tactical departure scheduling. An important question to consider for 
departure prediction accuracy is „how far in advance of departure does the downstream scheduling system need to 
have accurate OFF time predictions?‟ 
In order to estimate the minimal look-ahead time at which accurate OFF time predictions are required for aircraft 
departing into an arrival metering flow, one should consider the relative positions of the departure airport and the 
arrival metering freeze horizon. The geometry of the DFW-to-IAH metering scenario is illustrated in Fig. 8. DFW 
airport lies within the IAH 
arrival metering freeze 
horizon and the standard 
tactical departure 
scheduling procedure is to 
accept and freeze the 
aircraft into the arrival IAH 
flow to prevent the aircraft 
from receiving both a 
ground delay and an 
airborne delay. Due to this 
scheduling methodology, 
any surface or airborne 
prediction error in tactical 
departure scheduling to 
IAH during metering 
directly impacts the 
airborne arrival stream. For 
present-day operations this 
OFF time prediction is 
entirely manual. For the 
 
Figure 8. Method to estimate OFF prediction look ahead time need for DFW 
aircraft departing into Houston arrival metering. 
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DFW to IAH metering scenario, the typical airborne aircraft scheduled into IAH over meter fix RIICE freezes at 
approximately 30.4 minutes prior to meter fix crossing when IAH traffic is in East flow, which is the predominant 
configuration used during metering at IAH. The typical flight time from DFW airport to the RIICE meter fix 
crossing is approximately 27.7 minutes. This means that an aircraft on the DFW surface which is ready to depart 
will be competing for slots with airborne aircraft whose schedules have been frozen on average for 30.4 – 27.7 = 2.7 
minutes (162 seconds). If the DFW aircraft are to compete with unfrozen aircraft for a slot into the constrained flow 
then the tactical scheduling process must occur at least 162 seconds prior to departure. The 162 second figure 
represents a theoretical minimum for the tactical departure scheduling lead time. Additional time is required for the 
Center TMU to consider the schedule and communicate the release time to ATCT. Some time is also required for 
the TMA scheduler to find a slot for the aircraft in its schedule and optimize the overall arrival stream schedule 
based upon the new information. The time needed for scheduling purposes in addition to the theoretical 162 seconds 
is being called the “coordination time” in Fig. 8. 
Operational observations of PDRC at DFW during July 2011 have revealed that the typical departure schedule 
process is initiated approximately 5 minutes prior to departure during Call For Release situations. According to 
ATCT and Center personnel this amount of time prior to departure allows for sufficient coordination and meets the 
minimal need for look-ahead time requirements at DFW. That is not to say that both ATCT and Center don‟t want 
the times earlier, but this was an acceptable timeframe for the manually-coordinated tactical departure scheduling 
process in place today. Considering site feedback and the 2.7 minute flight time difference which would allow these 
aircraft to compete with non-frozen aircraft in the IAH metered stream, this allows approximately 2.3 minutes of 
“coordination time” for the tactical departure scheduling process at DFW. It is believed that this look ahead time 
estimation process can be used for other airports that have a high demand for tactical departure scheduling to 
identify the look ahead time at which accuracy departure time predictions are needed. Based upon PDRC field test 
observations as well as data obtained from FAA evaluation of TMA scheduling from air traffic control towers,8,9 it is 
estimated that through automation the “coordination time” taken for the tactical departure scheduling process can be 
reduced to approximately 30 seconds. Thus, the minimal look ahead time requirement for DFW is 162 + 30 = 192 
seconds prior to wheels OFF. 
B. Surface prediction accuracy at required look-ahead time for Tactical Departure Scheduling  
 The look-ahead time need was based upon relative geometry of the departure airport to the arrival metering 
freeze horizon plus required coordination time. Look-ahead requirement will likely vary based upon different airport 
geometry relative to arrival metering freeze horizons, or the airspace geometry associated with EDC flows.  Beyond 
the look-ahead requirement, there remains the question of required departure prediction accuracy at the specified 
look-ahead time. The departure prediction accuracy requirement may be estimated from observed CFR time 
compliance in today‟s tactical scheduling scenario. If surface automation delivers the same level of accuracy 
provided today by the manual CFR procedure, then it follows that it should provide similar benefit to the existing 
system. Any increase in the accuracy of the departure prediction times or increased look-ahead time for the 
prediction would be potentially beneficial to tactical departure scheduling system performance. An additional 
observation to consider is that workload 
associated with the manual CFR procedure may 
lead to relatively infrequent use. Any automation 
that may help reduce the workload threshold at 
which this level of accuracy could be obtained 
would likely be used more frequently, which 
would potentially lead to increased benefits. 
Another factor to consider is that of any 
uncertainty that is the result of manual entry or 
miscommunications like those reports in a 
companion paper.1 
Currently, the manual CFR procedure must 
deliver OFF times that comply with a -2/+1 
minute window. Based upon tactical departure 
scheduling data for the month of January 2011, 
this time window is being met approximately 62% 
of the time by ATCT control of flights to meet 
their CFR coordinated OFF time. Based upon 
measurements obtained of the Surface Decision 
 
Figure 9. SDSS prediction accuracy at DFW - June 2011. 
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Support System (SDSS) accuracy in June of 2011, SDSS can predict aircraft wheels OFF at the same level of 
controlled CFR flights at approximately 137 seconds prior to OFF time. That is to say that without any CFR manual 
coordination required (e.g. closed loop system); SDSS can achieve similar levels of predictive accuracy as departure 
time compliance being achieved today through the CFR process at 137 seconds prior to departure. To meet the 
tactical departure scheduling requirements for DFW, this level of accuracy must be extended at least to the point of 
162 seconds as mentioned previously including any coordination time required for the tactical departure flight. 
However, it is not necessarily true that SDSS must provide this level of accuracy out to the five minutes which 
current DFW procedure provides. This is due to the coordination time required when using automation is expected 
to be reduced from the time it takes in the current procedure. During the initial evaluation of PDRC the focus was on 
establishing confidence in the surface and en route scheduling components, not on reducing the time period it takes 
for tactical departure scheduling to occur. Future evaluations should work to increase the amount of look ahead time 
that accurate OFF time predictions are available while reducing the amount of coordination time required for the 
tactical departure scheduling process.  
Work is currently underway to increase the accuracy of the existing surface management system‟s predictive 
capability for those aircraft which have acquired surface surveillance. In addition to the increasing the system‟s 
predictive accuracy, areas of research that are recommended are: stability of the OFF time estimates which are 
provided to the downstream scheduler, utilization of departure prediction confidence in tactical departure 
scheduling, evaluation of tactical scheduling methods which require OFF time estimates in excess of 10 minutes 
prior to departure and expansion of OFF time estimates to include airports without ASDE-X surveillance capability. 
V. NAS facilities likely to have greatest benefit from PDRC Technology  
 Given knowledge of the current tactical departure scheduling demand at each NAS facility, as well as estimated 
look ahead time requirements for each facility based upon geometry like that illustrated in Fig. 8, a list of the top 
NAS facilities which would benefit from PDRC technology was constructed. This survey focused on inbound 
tactical departure scheduling since 86.5% of tactical departure scheduling ground delay incurred in the NAS today is 
scheduled in this manner. 
 The estimation methodology begins with sites that have a proven demand for tactical departure scheduling like 
those listed in Table 1. Only the 
top 10% users of tactical departure 
scheduling airport pairs (e.g. 
KDFW into KIAH) excluding 
international scheduling were 
considered. This yielded 81 
airports scheduling into 7 different 
metered airports, each of which 
tactically scheduled over 130 
aircraft during the month of 
January. The next step was to 
analyze each departure/arrival 
airport pair to determine the look-
ahead time need of each airport, 
like that illustrated in Fig. 8. In 
order to include look-ahead time 
needs that are achievable based 
upon surface surveillance 
availability, it was necessary to 
bound the look-ahead time by the 
average surface taxi out time.  The 
nationwide average of unimpeded 
taxi out time of 10.7 minutes was 
obtained from the FAA‟s Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM) database.  Those airports with greater than 
10.7 minutes look-ahead time requirement prior to departure were eliminated from the list, which left 55 airports.  
The remaining candidate airports were further filtered according to current or planned availability of an ASDE-X 
surface surveillance system which would allow for trajectory based OFF time estimates to be supplied to the tactical 
Table 4. Sites which would benefit from PDRC technology – Jan 2011. 
Scheduled 
From
Airport Code Scheduling From Airport Name
Scheduled Into 
Metered Airport
Code Scheduling Into Metered Airport Name
Hours 
Delay
Number of 
Scheduled
Aircraft
KMCO Orlando International KATL Hartsfield - Jackson Atlanta International 47.9 628
KMEM Memphis International KATL Hartsfield - Jackson Atlanta International 38.0 381
KATL Hartsfield - Jackson Atlanta International KCLT Charlotte/Douglas International 32.4 426
KBOS Logan International KPHL Philadelphia International 28.0 385
KLAS Mc Carran International KLAX Los Angeles International 18.8 381
KIAD Washington Dulles International KCLT Charlotte/Douglas International 17.4 263
KDTW Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County KPHL Philadelphia International 16.1 278
KSDF Louisville International KATL Hartsfield - Jackson Atlanta International 15.9 230
KCLE Cleveland-Hopkins International KPHL Philadelphia International 15.7 203
KLAX Los Angeles International KLAS Mc Carran International 15.4 318
KSFO San Francisco International KLAX Los Angeles International 15.0 333
KDFW Dallas/Fort Worth International KIAH George Bush Intercontinental/Houston 13.3 168
KCVG Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International KCLT Charlotte/Douglas International 12.9 258
KDCA Ronald Reagan Washington National KCLT Charlotte/Douglas International 12.0 246
KBWI Baltimore/Washington International KCLT Charlotte/Douglas International 11.4 271
KPHX Phoenix Sky Harbor International KLAS Mc Carran International 11.1 196
KCVG Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International KATL Hartsfield - Jackson Atlanta International 10.8 199
KSAN San Diego International KPHX Phoenix Sky Harbor International 7.3 189
KSJC Norman Y. Mineta San Jose International KLAX Los Angeles International 7.2 168
KLAS Mc Carran International KPHX Phoenix Sky Harbor International 6.6 200
KMCO Orlando International KCLT Charlotte/Douglas International 6.1 250
KLAX Los Angeles International KPHX Phoenix Sky Harbor International 5.7 213
KSDF Louisville International KCLT Charlotte/Douglas International 5.7 190
KSNA John Wayne-Orange County KLAS Mc Carran International 5.5 140
KSNA John Wayne-Orange County KPHX Phoenix Sky Harbor International 3.6 173
KSFO San Francisco International KLAS Mc Carran International 2.6 154  
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departure scheduler. This remaining list consisted of 26 airports, which were ordered by the delay they incurred in 
January 2011, as listed in Table 4. 
 The “Scheduling From” column in Table 4 indicates the airport from which tactical departure scheduled aircraft 
are departing, while the “Scheduled into Metered Airport” indicates the destination of the tactical departure 
scheduled.  
 At the top of the list are two airports that are not only ASDE-X equipped, but also have a current Surface 
Decision Support System (SDSS) adapted. In addition, the third and fourth airports on the list are currently being 
adapted for the SDSS system in support of other research.  
 A notable omission from Table 4 is scheduling from Charlotte to Atlanta.  While 426 aircraft were tactically 
scheduled from Charlotte to Atlanta during the month of January, only 35 of these occurred during an Atlanta 
metering period.  The lack of tactical departure scheduling during metering may be due to the „hybrid metering‟ 
design that Atlanta uses in which adjacent centers meters outside of Atlanta Center airspace but the metering 
advisories are not displayed on Atlanta Center glass. 
Analysis of site geometry relative to the freeze horizon indicates that the look-ahead time at which accurate 
departure predictions are needed becomes greater as the distance from the departure airport within the freeze horizon 
increases. Inbound tactical departure scheduling analysis has demonstrated that the majority of scheduling occurs 
near the arrival freeze horizon boundary (11.3 minute average flight time to freeze horizon with 11.4 minute 
standard deviation). Some of the airports being scheduled from to an arrival metering facility lie geographically 
inside of the freeze horizon, while others lie outside of the freeze horizon. Heavier usage of tactical departure 
scheduling near the freeze horizon is consistent with intuition as flights which are sufficiently far away from the 
TMA freeze horizon generally have sufficient time and space in the arrival stream in order to secure a slot prior to 
the freeze horizon location. As departing airports get closer to or are within the TMA freeze horizon, the scheduling 
process becomes more dependent upon the departure prediction accuracy as there is less time for a departing aircraft 
to compete for resources in the overhead stream while the demand for overhead resources generally also becomes 
greater. In this manner the geometry of a departure airport relevant to the freeze horizon of the arrival TMA system 
being scheduled into is an important factor to consider.  
Figure 10 illustrates this relationship which is being referred to as the „Goldilocks Zone‟ in which achievable 
levels of departure prediction accuracy can be used for tactical departure scheduling. The following example 
considers if a departure 
airport requires 15 minutes 
flying time within the arrival 
freeze horizon to an arrival 
metering facility. To actively 
compete with non-frozen 
aircraft which are currently 
airborne in the arrival 
stream, the look-ahead time 
predictions must be accurate 
enough for TMA at least 15 
minutes prior to departure. 
Any error in the departure 
prediction estimate 
scheduled at this point will 
directly impact the arrival 
stream efficiency as well as 
controller workload if the 
sector controller meter list is 
rippled due to changes. On 
the other hand if the 
departure airport is 60 
minutes flying time outside of the freeze horizon, then despite the level of departure prediction accuracy, the aircraft 
will likely have adequate time to be scheduled into the arrival TMA system. 
 
Figure 10. Inbound tactical departure scheduling ‘Goldilocks Zone’ 
relationship between departure airport location and freeze horizon.   
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VI. Conclusions  
 Analysis of operational TMA and EDC data from all current deployed facilities covering over 1,082,000 
flights during the month of January 2011 indicates that these tactical departure scheduling capabilities are widely 
used in the NAS today with over 65,000 scheduled aircraft per month using these methods. Increased utilization of 
tactical departure scheduling decision support tools has been fueled by expansion of adjacent center metering and 
nation-wide deployment of the EDC capability.  
Although tactical departure scheduling with TMA and EDC has become a widely used component in NAS 
operations today and represents a significant improvement over the previous process which lacked trajectory based 
ascent modeling, analysis of the current system‟s performance indicates that significant room for improvement 
exists by reducing departure time uncertainty. Based upon operational data analysis described in this paper, 6,792 
inbound tactically scheduled aircraft and 1,911 outbound tactically scheduled aircraft in January 2011 NAS wide are 
estimated to have missed the airspace slot they were scheduled into due to departure time prediction uncertainty. 
The effect to the NAS of a missed scheduled departure slot often leads directly to lost capacity, most notably in the 
case in which an aircraft is scheduled frozen into an arrival TMA slot but does not meet its expected departure time 
window. However, measuring the impact to the NAS of a missed departure slot is not always straightforward as 
some ability to recover the airspace resources exists, often at the cost of additional TMC or controller workload 
and/or inefficient flight paths.   
 While the shortfalls of the existing tactical departure scheduling system have become more evident and 
quantifiable, solutions to these shortfalls are in early stages of maturity relative to other NAS systems. Determining 
the level of predictive accuracy that trajectory based OFF time predictions must attain for tactical departure 
scheduling delay reduction benefit is complicated by the lack of surface automation available in operations today 
and the challenges associated with evaluating a passive OFF time estimation process. This paper proposes metrics 
and methods to estimate the look ahead time requirement of surface predictions, as well as to identify target airports 
that are likely candidates for NAS deployment of PDRC technology based upon the departure airport‟s geometry 
relative to areas of high airspace demand like those encountered near time based metering freeze horizons. 
Indications are that departure prediction accuracy requirements for tactical departure scheduling in the NAS are 
likely not a single value, but rather a range of values that vary in significant part based upon site specific geometry 
and airspace demand. 
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